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Using data on accidents and incidents experienced by 
U.S. commercial airlines from 1983 to 1997, we investi- 
gated variation in firm learning by examining whether 
firms learn more from errors with heterogeneous or 
homogeneous causes. We measured learning by a reduc- 
tion in airline accident and incident rates, while control- 
ling for other factors related to accidents and incidents. 
Our results show that heterogeneity is generally better 
for learning, as prior heterogeneity in the causes of errors 
decreases subsequent accident rates, producing a deeper, 
broader search for causality than simple explanations like 
"blame the pilot." The benefits of heterogeneity, howev- 
er, apply mainly to specialist airlines. Generalist airlines 
learn, instead, from outside factors such as the experi- 
ence of others and general improvements in technology. 
These results suggest a theory of learning across organi- 
zational forms: complex forms benefit from simple infor- 
mation, and simple forms benefit from complex informa- 
tion. The implications of our study for learning theories 
and work on organizational errors are discussed.? 
For all the scientific pizzazz [involved in airline accident investi- 
gations], unraveling the subtle, complex chain of events lead- 
ing to aviation deaths is proving more elusive than ever. 
-"Why more plane-crash probes end in doubt," 
Wall Street Journal, March 22, 1999 
Organizations like airlines try to learn from experience, under- 
standing what went wrong so that it won't go wrong next 
time. But if, as the quote above suggests, the causes are 
often left in doubt, such learning is likely to be difficult. 
Learning is also likely to vary across firms, despite industry 
regulation that should affect all airlines equally. Investigators 
of the 2000 Air France Concorde crash discovered that British 
Airways had recommended changes to the Concorde's water 
deflector in 1995 but that Air France had not made those 
changes (Phillips, 2000). As Donoghue (1998: 36) explained, 
"... any safety initiative has an unequal effect on the carriers 
and becomes an issue to be promoted or fought ... seeking 
the path that best suits [the airline] individually." Other heavi- 
ly regulated industries, such as nuclear power, also show 
substantial variance in incident rates among firms (Morris and 
Engelken, 1973), which indicates that firms vary in how 
effectively they learn from their experience. Despite much 
discussion and analysis of aviation errors (airline accidents 
and incidents), there has been little work investigating the 
role of organizational earning and none examining variation in 
learning across firms in the industry. 
Learning from experience has been shown to have important 
effects on such varied outcomes as manufacturing plant pro- 
ductivity (e.g., Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990), service 
timeliness (Argote and Darr, 2000), and hotel survival (Baum 
and Ingram, 1998). If firms learn from experience, then the 
attributes of this experience are likely to affect the rate and 
effectiveness of learning. Some firms have heterogeneous 
experience in that their accidents and incidents ("errors") are 
caused by a large number of different factors, which are like- 
ly to interact in complex ways. Some firms have more homo- 
geneous experience, with errors caused by a small number 
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of similar factors. It is likely that the complexity of prior expe- 
riences, as well as characteristics of the firms themselves, 
affect how well airlines can learn from that experience. We 
investigate these issues in the context of airline accidents 
and incidents to explain variation in learning among firms in 
the airline industry. 
According to the NTSB (2001) Code of Federal Regulations 
(49CFR830.2, p. 1195), an accident "means an occurrence 
... in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in 
which the aircraft received substantial damage." An incident 
is "an occurrence other than an accident, which affects or 
could affect the safety of operations." Accidents and inci- 
dents are the error experiences from which airlines have the 
potential to learn. 
EFFECTS OF PRIOR EXPERIENCE ON LEARNING 
In the literature on organizational earning there is a large 
body of work on the learning curve. The learning curve is an 
empirical finding showing that, in general, experience pro- 
duces improvement. Early empirical work on the learning 
curve showed that the log of unit costs tends to decrease lin- 
early with the log of cumulative production volume. So, for 
example, cumulative production experience tends to lower 
costs in shipbuilding and automotive production (Argote and 
Epple, 1990), nuclear power plant production (Zimmerman, 
1982), and coal generation (Joskow and Rose, 1985). More 
recent work has moved away from a focus on cost reduction 
and productivity improvement to other outcomes of learning. 
These studies have shown that experience improves cus- 
tomer service and product quality (Darr, Argote, and Epple, 
1995; Lapre, Mukherjee, and Van Wassenhove, 2000) and 
increases the survival rates of hotels (Ingram and Baum, 
1997; Baum and Ingram, 1998) and banks (Kim and Miner, 
2000). 
In the context of airlines and their errors, it may be that air- 
lines learn from error experience and are able to improve per- 
formance over time, reducing subsequent errors (i.e., acci- 
dents and incidents). If we look at the airline industry over 
long time periods, this seems to be the case. Figure 1 plots 
the accident rate (accidents per 100,000 hours flown) for all 
U.S. airlines from 1955 to 1997 and exhibits a characteristic 
learning curve, i.e., as experience accumulates with the pas- 
sage of time, the error rate declines. 
When individual airlines' accident rates are broken out, as 
they are in table 1 for some of the larger U.S. airlines, we 
see the same general decrease in accidents over time as in 
figure 1, but there is also a fair amount of variance across air- 
lines. For example, from 1957 to 1986, American Airlines had 
an average of 10.3 accidents per million departures and US 
Air had 6.6. Variation in airline error rates could come from 
many sources. One obvious source is the characteristics of 
the individual airline, e.g., whether it is large or small, the age 
of its fleet, characteristics of its corporate culture, its man- 
agement team, and its training procedures. Another possible 
source of variation, however, is differences in the characteris- 
tics of the accidents and incidents experienced by these dif- 
ferent airlines. Because experience affects organizational 
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Figure 1. U.S. airline accident rates for all airlines by time period.* 
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* Source: NTSB, FAA Flight Statistics Reports, various years. 
learning, different types of experiences are likely to produce 
variation in learning rates. One source of differences in expe- 
rience is whether that experience has homogeneous or het- 
erogeneous causes. 
Homogeneity and heterogeneity of experience have been 
shown to affect learning about mergers and acquisitions 
(Beckman and Haunschild, 2002), and heterogeneity may also 
affect an organization's ability and/or motivation to learn from 
errors such as accidents and incidents. The distinction 
between heterogeneous and homogeneous causes of acci- 
dents is evident in the following examples of two recent air- 
line accidents. Southwest Airlines had an accident in 1997 in 
Table 1 
Accident Rates (per Million Departures) for Selected Large Airlines* 
Period 
Airline 1957-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-82 1981-86 Average 
Alaska 95.5 41.1 17.7 7.5 9.5 3.3 26.0 
American 24.8 14.2 7.7 9.1 6.4 3.8 10.3 
Braniff 7.9 10.8 9.0 4.5 4.7 4.0 6.7 
Continental 13.2 20.9 7.3 4.1 8.4 7.8 10.1 
Delta 10.9 11.7 11.2 11.6 4.9 1.6 8.3 
Northwest 33.2 16.8 17.2 12.2 0.0 1.8 10.6 
Pan Am 40.3 30.2 15.4 17.2 7.7 6.1 19.8 
Southwest 2.9 2.9 
TWA 19.4 21.5 8.1 15.4 2.8 1.6 10.9 
United 11.5 12.6 12.6 4.6 1.6 4.5 7.7 
US Air 12.5 7.7 6.7 6.1 4.7 3.6 6.6 
Western 12.3 9.5 6.0 2.6 5.0 1.0 5.7 
* Source: Rose (1990) 
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which one passenger was seriously injured and four others 
received minor injuries. The cause of this accident was attrib- 
uted to (1) birds ingested in the left engine, which caused a 
compressor stall; (2) an improperly rejected takeoff by the 
pilot; (3-5) a flight attendant ordering a passenger evacuation 
without (a) informing the captain, (b) communicating with the 
other attendants, or (c) determining the location of a suspect- 
ed (but not actual) fire; and (6) the airline failing to provide 
joint crew resource management (CRM) training to all crew 
members (NTSB report ATL96FA101). This is an accident 
with heterogeneous underlying causes. The causes interact- 
ed in complex ways (Perrow, 1984), resulting in an accident 
in which, had any one of these six causes not been present, 
the accident probably would not have occurred. In contrast, 
in a Delta Airlines accident in 1995, a flight attendant was 
seriously injured during an episode of severe turbulence. The 
cause of the accident was attributed to the fact that the flight 
attendant was not seated, despite notification from the pilot 
that everyone should be seated because of turbulence in the 
area (NTSB report MIA95LA055). This is an accident with a 
homogeneous underlying cause. 
Clearly, some aviation errors are due to more heterogeneous 
causes than others, with the causes often interacting in com- 
plex ways. Also, some airlines tend to experience more het- 
erogeneous, complex accidents and incidents than other air- 
lines. It is not obvious, however, what the role of such 
heterogeneity is in the management of errors and whether 
complexity benefits or hinders airlines in their ability to learn 
from these experiences. Existing literature provides conflict- 
ing accounts, with some suggestion that people learn better 
from heterogeneity or complexity and some that they learn 
better from homogeneity or simplicity. The literature on orga- 
nizational learning provides some starting points for under- 
standing these issues. Scholars have identified several key 
learning processes, including trial-and-error learning, vicarious 
learning from others, and active inferential learning (Miner 
and Mezias, 1996). In rare events, such as an accident or 
near-accident, trial-and-error learning is difficult (Weick, 1987). 
Airlines instead try to overcome the paucity of experience by 
simulating many potential accident and incident situations. 
Yet the number of permutations and combinations of events 
that could conceivably cause a problem is too large for all sit- 
uations to be simulated. As a result, some scholars are pes- 
simistic about whether organizations like airlines can learn 
from their accident and incident experiences (Carroll, 1995). 
Despite the difficulties associated with learning from rare 
events, however, some hazardous systems (including airlines) 
do seem to have remarkably good safety records (Perrow, 
1984; Roberts, 1991, 1993). Also, the fact that individual air- 
lines have significantly reduced their accident rates over time 
suggests that some form of learning is occurring. Perrow 
(1994), more optimistic about the possibility that airlines can 
learn, suggested that the relatively low number of serious 
accidents in the airline industry relative to other industries 
may be due to industry-specific factors such as the efficient 
dispersion of information on aviation errors and airline density (Perrow, 1994: 17). 
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While the airline industry is heavily regulated, and the disper- 
sion of information about accidents and incidents is fairly effi- 
cient, there is still likely to be variance in firm-level learning. 
Figure 1 showed that accidents and incidents are relatively 
rare, as less than 10 occur in every 100,000 flight hours. 
Most of these accidents are not serious, and fatal accidents 
are quite rare, occurring once in every three million flights, on 
average. If we look at the number of accidents per year 
instead of the rate per flight hour, however, accidents are 
actually not so rare. The nine largest airlines experienced an 
average of 3.1 accidents and 18 serious incidents per year 
during the 1986-1996 period. So while errors are rare on a 
relative basis, they are not all that rare on an absolute basis. 
Airline officials, pilots, and regulators do pay attention to both 
accidents and incidents and generally attempt to learn from 
them (Reason, 1997). This is consistent with the well-known 
idea that organizations tend to search for solutions when 
results fail to meet aspirations (March and Simon, 1958; 
Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 1998). And contemporary 
learning studies show that organizational failures, such as 
accidents and incidents, are an important stimulant to organi- 
zational learning and change (Sitkin, 1992; Greve, 1998; 
Miner et al., 1999; Kim and Miner, 2000). Of course, 
attempts to learn are not always successful in terms of pre- 
venting future accidents and may even be harmful (Perrow, 
1984), but there are likely to be some factors that affect 
whether these attempts to learn are successful, among them 
the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the causes of prior acci- 
dent and incident experiences. 
Heterogeneous Causes 
There is some suggestion in the literature that prior experi- 
ence with heterogeneous causes will be better for reducing 
subsequent errors than experience with homogeneous caus- 
es. Three factors suggest that heterogeneity will be better 
than homogeneity: (1) variance helps focus attention on 
latent causes and thus leads to a deeper analysis of the prob- 
lem (Reason, 1997); (2) variance forces a situational analysis, 
rather than a simple "blame the operator" response, and (3) 
heterogeneity produces constructive conflict in groups, which 
leads to better analyses and problem responses (Jehn, 
Northcraft, and Neale, 1999). The argument that heterogene- 
ity produces better analyses of latent causes comes from 
work on organizational accidents. Reason (1997) argued that 
organizations tend to focus on the surface when attempting 
to learn from failures. They focus on active failures, rather 
than trying to dig deeper and uncover problematic latent 
conditions. Heterogeneity in causes, with complex interac- 
tions of multiple factors, is likely to force organizations to 
look harder, to get away from the proximate or simple 
explanations. 
As part of this study, we conducted informational interviews 
with executives of three major and six regional airlines. One 
of these executives provided an example of how heterogene- 
ity can aid in a deeper causal analysis. This airline had two 
different accidents occur within a one-year period. One acci- 
dent was caused when a pilot decided to take off without de- 
icing a plane (a decision under that pilot's control), and the ice 
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buildup caused an accident. The second accident occurred as 
the result of a pilot calling in maintenance personnel to check 
out an engine warning light. After inspecting and fixing the 
problem, the maintenance crew released the aircraft o the 
flight crew but neglected to replace the drive covers on the 
engines, resulting in the loss of oil from both engines during 
flight. On the surface, the causes of these two accidents do 
not seem to be related. But they both occurred in an airline 
whose culture promoted on-time departures as a key goal, 
which affected the decisions made by both the pilot (to save 
time by not de-icing) and the maintenance worker (in a hurry 
to finish quickly and, so, forgot to replace the covers). Thus, 
an aspect of the organization's culture contributed to both 
accidents (cf. Reason, 1997; Vaughan, 1999). The airline 
executive noted that this discovery only came about because 
the airline underwent an in-depth consideration of the under- 
lying causal structure of accidents, which was prompted by 
the different causes present in these two accidents. 
Underlying systematic causes are more likely to be noticed 
and corrected when errors are diverse, as homogeneous 
errors will not lead to a deep analysis of the underlying struc- 
ture of the problem. It is difficult to look for connections 
among disconnected events, but to the extent that it can 
happen, it is likely to result in better solutions. In fact, many 
researchers propose that organizations look deeper, and not 
focus narrowly in their analysis of causes, as a prescriptive 
solution to accident prevention (e.g., Reason, 1987). Thus, an 
airline experiencing heterogeneous accident causes may be 
forced to dig deeper, to get away from the proximate causes 
(e.g., the pilot, the maintenance person) and look at latent 
conditions (e.g., organizational culture). 
A second, related reason why heterogeneous causes may 
lead to more learning from errors than homogeneity is that 
heterogeneity may force an organization to shift attention 
away from a given individual as the cause of the accident. As 
we know from attribution theory, there is a tendency to focus 
on the person, not the situation, as the cause of events (Nis- 
bett and Ross, 1980; Fiske and Taylor, 1984). This is especial- 
ly true when the events have serious consequences, which 
results in a tendency to "blame the operator" (Perrow, 1984). 
In airline accidents, there is a strong tendency to blame the 
pilot. Attributing the causes of an accident to human error 
inhibits the organization's ability to learn from that accident 
(Sagan, 1993), in part because once the human being has 
been fired, transferred, or replaced, there is assumed to be 
no more problem in the system. Yet Perrow (1984) and Rea- 
son (1997) noted that human error is rarely the only cause of 
an accident or incident. Thus, heterogeneous causes are 
more likely to lead an organization to acknowledge and deal 
with the multiple underlying causes, not all of which are 
human error, and thus lead to better understanding and solu- 
tions to the problems, which will reduce future accidents. 
The final reason why heterogeneous causes may promote 
more learning than homogenous ones is that many error 
investigations, including airline accident investigations, are 
done by groups. The literature on small groups offers insight 
into the processes set in motion by diverse information and 
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the links between diverse information and improved perfor- 
mance. Diverse information stimulates constructive conflict 
around issues, which leads people to deliberate about appro- 
priate action, and this deliberation tends to improve group 
performance, especially on complex tasks (Jehn, Northcraft, 
and Neale, 1999). Thus, the process of attempting to learn 
from experience with heterogeneous causes is likely to stir 
constructive conflict, generate debate, and result in more 
perspectives on the problem. This, in turn, should lead to a 
better understanding of the problem and to solutions that 
reduce future accidents. 
The above discussion suggests that experience that has het- 
erogeneous causes puts organizations in a better position to 
learn from that experience, and this will result in a greater 
reduction in subsequent error rates than experience that has 
homogeneous causes. This is because heterogeneous expe- 
rience results in more in-depth analysis of latent causes, a 
shifting of focus away from a blame-the-operator esponse, 
and/or more constructive conflict and airing of perspectives. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The greater the heterogeneity of prior causes of 
an organization's errors, the lower the subsequent error rate for that 
organization. 
While each accident and incident has an associated level of 
heterogeneity in causes, each airline also has an associated 
level of heterogeneity in causes when the heterogeneity of 
its accidents and incidents is aggregated over some time 
period. It is not clear whether airlines will learn from hetero- 
geneity in causes within or across accidents, or both. The 
argument about in-depth analysis and the example from our 
interviews about discovering a cultural explanation would 
suggest that heterogeneity in causes across accidents might 
be more likely to trigger this analysis process. The argument 
about constructive group conflict might be more applicable to 
one particular accident, as different groups are likely to be 
involved in investigating different accidents. Because of this 
ambiguity, we conducted and report analyses at both levels: 
within-accident heterogeneity and across-accident 
heterogeneity. 
We had earlier suggested that one reason why heterogeneity 
in causes might result in fewer and less severe accidents 
and incidents is that causal heterogeneity is more likely than 
homogeneity to result in a reduction in the tendency to 
blame the operator. Therefore, if we do find that the hetero- 
geneity of causes reduces error rates, and if the reason 
behind this decline is a decrease in the tendency to blame 
the operator (the pilot), then we should see fewer operator 
errors in airlines with more prior experience with heteroge- 
neous causes. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the heterogeneity of prior causes of 
an organization's errors, the lower the subsequent number of opera- 
tor errors for that organization. 
Homogeneous Causes 
Although we have argued that heterogeneity in the causes of 
errors might benefit organizations in their attempts to learn 
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from their errors, there are also theoretical arguments for 
why homogeneity, rather than heterogeneity, might benefit 
learning. Three mechanisms may explain how the homogene- 
ity of a firm's own experience facilitates learning: (1) salience 
and attention factors, (2) ease of understanding, and (3) as an 
aid to viewing errors as systematic rather than random. Each 
of these mechanisms may, in turn, lead to better problem 
fixes, which are then reflected in a reduction in subsequent 
error rates. 
One reason why firms have difficulty learning and changing is 
inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Organizations find it dif- 
ficult to recognize and respond to problems, which makes 
factors that overcome inertia important in stimulating learning 
and change. One such factor is salience (March, Sproull, and 
Tamuz, 1991), and one determinant of salience is repetition 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1984). Repetition of the same causes is 
likely to make those causes salient. Thus, the repetition of 
the same accident causes found with homogeneous error 
experience may aid in learning and thus reduce subsequent 
error rates. 
One might think that in situations in which errors have poten- 
tially serious consequences, and in highly regulated indus- 
tries, any problem that poses a potential threat to safety 
would be swiftly and effectively dealt with, but that does not 
always happen. Marcus and Nichols (1999) listed several 
warning signs preceding disasters like Bhopal and Three Mile 
Island-and how these signs were ignored. Sagan (1993) out- 
lined several nuclear-alert activities that continue to be prac- 
ticed, despite their dangers having been demonstrated during 
the Cuban missile crisis. Nance (1986) discussed the repeat- 
ed problems with Boeing 737-200s "pitching up," which 
received little attention. Thus, even in the airline industry, 
inertia may have to be overcome. Repetition of the same 
accident causes found with certain types of accident experi- 
ence may help overcome inertia and thus reduce subsequent 
error rates of that same type. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The greater the number of an organization's 
prior errors of a given type, the lower the subsequent rate of errors 
of that same type. 
Not all experience with simple causes constitutes repetition 
of the same events. Some organizations may just have errors 
with relatively simple causes, though the causes may differ 
from event to event. Decision-making theories suggest that 
such experience is easier to learn from than events with 
more heterogeneous causes, because simple causes are eas- 
ier to understand and analyze than complex interactions of 
multiple factors. Since complex causes are ambiguous, they 
tend to produce biased interpretations, reconstructions of his- 
tory to meet perceptions, and myths, fictions, and stories (March and Olsen, 1988; Sagan, 1993). The complexity 
involved in multiple heterogeneous causes may therefore 
result in poorer problem fixes than those resulting from an 
analysis of simpler causes. 
Another reason why homogeneity in causes may result in 
more learning than heterogeneity comes from Reason's (1997) analyses of biases in error management. Reason sug- 
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gested that one key bias in accident management is that 
errors tend to be viewed as random, not systematic. It is 
easy to imagine that the six factors that interacted to pro- 
duce the Southwest Airlines accident described earlier would 
be highly unlikely to occur as a unit again. Viewing errors as 
random is likely to hinder learning by decreasing motivation 
and preventing an in-depth analysis of the problem situation. 
If homogeneity helps learning because it is easier to under- 
stand simple situations or because it helps overcome the ten- 
dency to view errors as random, and thereby do little about 
them, then this leads to the following counter-hypothesis to 
H1: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The greater the homogeneity of prior causes of 
an organization's errors, the lower the subsequent error rate for that 
organization. 
Generalists and Specialists 
The above discussion assumes that all airline organizations 
learn equally from their errors, but this assumption may not 
be warranted. In the airline industry, for example, Morris and 
Moore (2000) found that private pilots tend to learn more 
from their accident experience than commercial airline pilots. 
They attribute this effect to the greater accountability of com- 
mercial pilots to organizational supervisors, which dampens 
their ability to learn from the experience. In commercial air- 
lines, there may be analogous differences in learning 
between generalists and specialists. 
There is much work in organizational ecology investigating 
the differential life chances of generalists and specialists over 
time (e.g., Carroll, 1985). Specialist organizational forms 
depend on a narrow range of environmental resources for 
survival (Freeman and Hannan, 1983; Carroll, 1985). Their for- 
mal structure, patterns of activity, and normative order are 
different from generalist organizations, which depend on a 
wide range of environmental resources. Carroll (1985) out- 
lined the dynamics of markets composed of generalists and 
specialists in his resource-partitioning theory, and empirical 
support for resource-partitioning predictions has been found 
by researchers using data from several different industries, 
including beer brewing (e.g., Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992), 
wine production (Swaminathan, 1995), automobile manufac- 
turing (Torres, 1995), and airlines (Seidel, 1997). These stud- 
ies have made advances in our understanding of the life 
chances of specialists and generalists over time, but only a 
small number of studies have investigated the differences 
between generalists and specialists in their learning process- 
es. These studies include Barnett, Greve, and Park (1994), 
who found that specialist banks have higher returns to expe- 
rience (measured as a return on assets) than generalists; 
Ingram and Baum (1997) who found that generalists benefit 
less from their own operating experience and more from 
industry experience than specialists; and the above-men- 
tioned study by Morris and Moore (2000). This work sug- 
gests that generalists and specialists may also differ in their 
ability to learn from prior experience with heterogeneous 
causes. 
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Generalists and specialists differ in the complexity of their 
organizational form. Generalists are more complex because 
their larger resource space and broader range of products for 
customers mean that they have to deal with a wider range of 
issues than specialists do. Complexity magnifies the prob- 
lems organizations have in controlling and coordinating 
behavior. Complexity may also dampen learning from experi- 
ence, especially heterogeneous experience. Complex organi- 
zations are likely to be more political, and politicized organiza- 
tions investigate accidents in ways that do not necessarily 
promote accurate learning but, rather, protect the interests of 
the powerful actors in the organization (Perrow, 1984; Sagan, 
1993). Complex organizations also tend to have more hierar- 
chy and more compartmentalization, which makes it difficult 
to get accurate, complete feedback from the operators 
involved with an accident or incident. Actors in one part of 
the organization may not know what those in other parts are 
doing, let alone learn from their experiences (Sagan, 1993). 
Because errors with heterogeneous underlying causes are 
inherently complex, the information from such errors is less 
likely to be utilized effectively in complex systems, as the 
system is already overloaded with diverse information. It is 
more likely to be used effectively in simpler organizations. 
This suggests that specialist organizations will learn more 
from heterogeneous prior error experience than generalists. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Specialist organizations will learn more from 
errors with heterogeneous causes than will generalist organizations. 
METHOD 
Sample and Data 
The initial sample for the study is all U.S.-based commercial 
airlines that existed during the 1983-1997 period. The U.S. 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) tracks the acci- 
dents and serious incidents for these airlines and publishes 
this information in the NTSB Accident Database. Private 
pilots are not included in the database. There were 310 air- 
lines in existence during the 1983-1987 period, though there 
was also a lot of change, with a number of new entrants, fail- 
ures, and mergers. The airlines in the dataset vary substan- 
tially in size. The NTSB classifies airlines into the following 
size categories: large majors (e.g., American Airlines), nation- 
als (e.g., Alaska Air), large regionals (e.g., Midwest Express), 
and medium regionals (e.g., Independent Air). 
We collected data from the NTSB database on all the acci- 
dents and incidents experienced by these airlines during the 
1983-1997 period. We used 1983 as our starting year 
because accident reporting went through some changes that 
year, so data prior to 1983 are not completely comparable 
with data after 1983. As noted earlier, the NTSB defines any 
event that led to human injury, death, or serious equipment 
damage as an accident. An incident is an event not classified 
as an accident in which a hazard or potential hazard to safety 
was involved (NTSB, 2001). Because accidents are difficult to 
conceal, the reporting of them is quite accurate (Rose, 1990). 
Incidents were more inconsistently reported, but the 1984 
implementation of a computerized surveillance system by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) substantially increased 
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the number of incidents reported (Tamuz, 1987). To check for 
effects of possible bias in incident reporting, we analyzed 
accidents and incidents both separately and together. We 
also combined both fatal and nonfatal accidents in our analy- 
ses for two reasons: (1) the incidence of fatal accidents is 
extremely rare, making the estimation of fatal-accident mod- 
els very difficult, and (2) fatal and nonfatal accidents seem to 
be affected by the same factors (Rose, 1990). The 310 com- 
mercial airlines in our sample experienced a total of 1,346 
accidents and incidents during the 1983-1997 period. There 
were 12 large majors in the dataset, and they experienced a 
total of 531 accidents and incidents over the study period. 
There were also 34 nationals with 220 accidents and inci- 
dents, 90 large regionals with 224 accidents and incidents, 
and 174 medium regionals with 371 accidents and incidents. 
Calculating the event rates for these airlines reveals that 
while the large majors had larger numbers of accidents, their 
rate of accidents/incidents per 100,000 departures is only 
1.18, while the nationals had an average rate of 2.48, the 
large regionals a rate of 5.99, and the medium regionals a 
rate of 8.78. Thus the smaller airlines, while they experience 
fewer accidents and incidents on an absolute basis, actually 
have higher rates than the large majors. 
Dependent Variable 
Our primary dependent variable is the accident and incident 
(event) rate for each airline, which we calculated as the num- 
ber of accidents plus incidents per 100,000 departures. Using 
the rate per departure is a common way to measure accident 
rates, as most accidents occur on takeoff and landing, thus 
making the rate per departure more relevant than the rate 
per miles flown (Fromm, 1968). This variable was calculated 
for each airline and updated annually. We conducted analyses 
of accident rates and incident rates both separately and 
together as event rates. 
Independent Variables 
Prior accident heterogeneity. We constructed the prior-acci- 
dent heterogeneity measure as follows. We first used the 
NTSB accident/incident reports to construct a set of 23 acci- 
dent and incident cause categories. The NTSB reports con- 
tain narrative descriptions of accidents and incidents and, in 
some cases, a listing of NTSB-generated codes for the acci- 
dent or incident's observed cause(s). Because not all reports 
included NTSB-generated codes, we coded causes from the 
narratives and then checked our coding against the NTSB- 
generated codes. A sample accident report and a listing of 
our cause codes are shown in Appendix A and Appendix B. 
Two coders reviewed each NTSB accident or incident report 
and classified the accident/incident causes into the 23 cause 
categories listed in Appendix A. After a training period involv- 
ing the coding of 50 reports, we calculated interrater reliabili- 
ty. Cohen's Kappa (k) (Cohen, 1960) for all accident causes 
was .87, which is deemed good. After the training period, the 
coders worked alone. All discrepancies were resolved 
through discussion. 
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To construct an accident-cause heterogeneity measure, we 
used an entropy-based index, which is typical in measuring 
diversity or heterogeneity with categorical variables (Teach- 
man, 1980; Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Jehn, Northcraft and 
Neale, 1999). The index is calculated as follows: 
Diversity = -[P,(lnP,)], for i = 1 ... 23 
where P is the proportion of causes in each category i, and i 
represents the 23 possible categories of causes. Higher 
scores on the index mean the accident had more heteroge- 
neous underlying causes: the larger the number of causes 
and the more equal the proportion of each, the greater the 
heterogeneity. The index is not the same as a simple count 
of the number of causes, as an accident may have multiple 
causes of a single type. For example, an accident that was 
caused by two mechanical errors and one pilot error has less 
heterogeneous causes than an accident caused by one 
mechanical error, one pilot error, and one maintenance error. 
We also conducted analyses using a simple count measure 
instead of the heterogeneity measure. The results of these 
analyses are similar to those using the heterogeneity index, 
but they are also weaker in effect, suggesting that there is 
additional information in the heterogeneity measure that is 
not captured in a simple count of accident causes. We there- 
fore report analyses using the heterogeneity measure (results 
of the count analyses are available from the authors). 
Each accident and incident has an associated heterogeneity 
measure. Each airline also has an associated heterogeneity 
measure when the heterogeneity of its accidents and inci- 
dents is aggregated over a period of time. Since it is not clear 
whether airlines learn from heterogeneity or homogeneity 
within accidents or across accidents (or both), we conducted 
and report analyses at both levels. For the within-accident 
heterogeneity measure, we looked at the causes of each 
accident and constructed the measure at the accident level. 
For the across-accident heterogeneity measure, we looked at 
all prior accident causes and constructed the measure at the 
organization level. 
It is also unclear how much prior error experience is relevant 
and whether the effects of prior experience decay over time. 
Studies in other contexts have found that the value of experi- 
ence does tend to decay over time (e.g., Argote, 1999; Baum 
and Ingram, 1998), but they were done in contexts in which 
events are repeated frequently, such as product production 
or years of operating experience. We were dealing with rela- 
tively rare but salient events. The value of these events was 
not likely to depreciate as rapidly as that of the events in 
these other studies. Yet it is still likely that accidents that 
occurred in 1983 were more relevant in 1984 than they 
would have been ten years later, in 1994. 
We therefore used as our starting assumption that learning 
can occur within or across prior events but that the value of 
those events depreciates with time. We tested this assump- 
tion by running analyses using (1) only prior year's events, 
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(2) a rolling window of the prior three years' events, and (3) 
all prior events, back to the beginning of the sample. We also 
used various methods of discounting prior experience, to 
account for depreciation in the impact of events. As it is not 
clear a priori which discounting method is appropriate, we fol- 
lowed Baum and Ingram (1998) and ran analyses using four 
types of discounting. The first is no discount (e.g., each 
event is weighted by one). The second is discounting by the 
age of experience (e.g., for the rolling three-year window 
analyses, events the prior year are weighted by 3/3, the year 
before by 2/3, and the year before that by 1/3). The third is 
discounting by the square root of the age of experience, to 
account for the possibility that events depreciate more slowly 
than a straight age discount. Finally, the fourth is discounting 
by the square of the age of experience, to account for the 
possibility that events depreciate faster than a straight age 
discount. 
We generally found few differences in hypothesized effects 
across these various accumulation and discounting possibili- 
ties. The models using a prior three-year window are fairly 
stable and tend to fit better than those using only the prior 
year's experience and those using experience back to the 
start of the sample. In addition, discounting the prior three 
years' experience linearly (i.e., weighting last year's event by 
3/3, the year before by 2/3, and the year before by 1/3) pro- 
duces a better model fit than other discounting specifications 
(e.g., the square root or no discount). Therefore, we report 
analyses using a prior three-year window of experience, 
discounted linearly to account for depreciation of knowledge. 
As our sample starts in 1983, observations for 1984 and 
1985 were based on a one-year and two-year rolling window 
instead of three years. The observations were still 
discounted.1 
Because experience was aggregated across three years and 
then discounted, the within-event heterogeneity measure 
was constructed as follows: we measured heterogeneity for 
each airline's accident or incident, discounted each year's 
measure appropriately, then averaged the prior three years' 
measures. 
Within-event heterogeneity, Airline X Yeary = 
mean {(H Aly_1, H A2y_1 ... H Any )*1 + 
[(H Aly2, H A2y2 . . . H Any2)*.671 + 
[(H Aly3, H A2y3 . . . H Any,3)*.33]} 
^~~~~1 ~where y = year; H = heterogeneity; A1, A2 ... An = accident 
Distributional diagnostic tests performed or incident 1 . . . n for a given airline. 
on the heterogeneity variables show the distribution of the heterogeneity variable The across-event heterogeneity measure was constructed as is actually fairly smooth and normal. follows: we measured heterogeneity across all an airline's There is a clustering of values near zero 
and a few outliers at the very highest lev- accidents and incidents for a given year, discounted appropri- 
els. We ran a series of analyses to see if ately, and summed the prior three years' measures. We 
our results are sensitive to the deletion of summd instead of averaging on this measure because the near-zero values or the outliers (which e ear-zero alues r e utliers hich su ed instead of averaging on this easure because 
occur in the top 1 percent of the values). across-accident heterogeneity means that the prior three 
Results how that the deletion of these years' experience essentially should count as one accident cases does not change the significance of e 
our hypothesized results. with multiple causes. 
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Across-event heterogeneity, Airline X Yeary= 
(H Al ... ny-1 + [(H Al ... ny2)*.671 + [(H Al ... ny3)*.331 
Table 2 presents some sample heterogeneity calculations for 
1986, within and across accidents and incidents, and dis- 
counted and undiscounted. As can be seen from this table, 
the highest levels of heterogeneity are for those airlines 
whose accidents and incidents have many causes (denoted 
by C) distributed across the various cause categories (e.g., 
Airline F in table 2). 
Generalist or specialist. We used the Official Airline Guide 
(OAG), U.S. edition, and data from the Federal Aviation 
Administration and NTSB to classify airlines into specialists 
and generalists. The measure was designed to capture orga- 
nizational complexity. Organizational ecology studies have 
been moving away from using measures of generalism and 
Table 2 
Sample Heterogeneity Calculations for Accident and Incident Causes (C) for 1986 
Year Airline A Airline B Airline C Airline D Airline E Airline F 
1983 Cl C1,C2,C3,C4 Cl Cl C1,C2,C3,C4 C1,C2,C3,C4 
1983 Cl 02 C1,C2,C3,C4 C5,C6,C7,C8 
1984 Cl C3 C1,C2,C3,C4 C9,C1O,C11,C12 
1985 Cl C4 C1,C2,C3,C4 C13,C14,C15,C16 
Heterogeneity Calculations Het = - {Sum[(Pi)*(lnPi)1} for i = 1...23 
Airline A Within-accident heterogeneity 
Within-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Across-accident heterogeneity 
Across-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Airline B Within-accident heterogeneity 
Within-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Across-accident heterogeneity 
Across-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Airline C Within-accident heterogeneity 
Within-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Across-accident heterogeneity 
Across-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Airline D Within-accident heterogeneity 
Within-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Across-accident heterogeneity 
Across-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Airline E Within-accident heterogeneity 
Within-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Across-accident heterogeneity 
Across-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Airline F Within-accident heterogeneity 
Within-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
Across-accident heterogeneity 
Across-accident heterogeneity (disctd.) 
-[(1/1)*ln(1/1 )J* 33 
Same as within 
Same as within 
-{4*[(1/4)*ln(14)11 
-(4*[(1/4)*ln(1/4)1)*.33 
Same as within 
Same as within 
-mean ([(l/1)*ln(l/1)1 + l(l/1)*ln(1/1)1 
-mean ([(1/1)*ln(1/l )J*33 + 1(1/1)*ln(1/1)1]*33 
+ [(1/11)*ln(1Il1)l*.67 + [1(/1)*ln(1/1)]*11 
[(4/4)*In(4/4)1 
-1 [(2/4) * n(2/4)] *. 33 
+ [(1/4)*ln(1/4)l*.67 + [(114)*ln(114)1*1) 
-mean {[(1Il)*ln(1Il)1 + [(1I1)*ln(1/1)1 
-mean {[(1/1)*ln(1/1 )]* 33 + [(1/1)*ln(1I1n)J* 33 
+ma [(1/1)*In( /1)1*.33 + [(1/1)*ln(1/1)J* 33 
-{[(lI4)*ln(1I4)1*.33 + l(114)*ln(114)1*c.33 
+ 1(114)*ln(1411*.67 + [(114)*ln(114)l*1) 
-mean {4*[(1/4)*ln(1/4)1 + 4*1(1/4)*In(1/4)l + 4*(1/4)*In(1/4)1*6 + 4*(1/4)*ln(1/4)1*1 
-mean (4*1(1 /4)*ln(114)l*.3 + 4 1/4)*n(14)*l(/413 + 4*[ 1/4)*In(1/4)] + *[(1/4)*In(1/4)11 
-mean {4*[(1/4)*In(1/4)1* .33 + [4*(1/4)*In(1/4)1* .33 
+ 4*[(1/4)*ln(1/4)1*.67 + 4*U(1/4)*ln(1/4)J*11 
-(4 * [(4/1 6)* I n(4/1 6)1) {[4 *(211 6) I n (2/1 6)1 *. 33 
+ [4*(1/16)*ln(1/16)1*.67 + 14*(1/16)*ln(1/16)1*1) 
-mean {4*[(1/4)*ln(114)1 + [4*(1/4)*ln(1/4)l 
+ 4*[(114)*ln(114)I + 4*[(114)*ln(114)J} 
-mean {4*l(114)*In(114)1* .33 + [4*(114)*ln(114)1*.33 
+ 4*[(114)*ln(114)1*.67 + 4*[(1/4)*ln(114)l*1) 
-{16*1(1/16)*ln(1/1 6)11 
{8*U[(1/16)*ln(1/16)1*.33 + 
4*1(1/16)*ln(1/16)1*.67 + 4*[(1/16)*ln(1/16)1*1) 
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specialism that are highly correlated with size to those that 
more directly capture organizational complexity. These mea- 
sures tend to vary substantially from study to study, as they 
tend to be rooted in the specifics of the industry being stud- 
ied. So, for example, Carroll (1985) defined generalist news- 
paper organizations as those that publish one or more gener- 
al-interest papers (Carroll, 1985). Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan 
(2001) used the spread of engine capacity over all models 
produced by an automotive firm as a measure of generalism. 
We used a commonly accepted airline industry standard for 
measuring level of specialization: fleet diversity (cf. Seidel, 
1997). Fleet diversity was calculated using the same formula 
as causal heterogeneity, Diversity = 
-[P,(lnPj)], for i = 1 . . . n, 
where P is the proportion of planes in each type i, and i rep- 
resents the possible types of planes (e.g., 727s, 737s, 
MD80s). Higher scores on the index mean the airline has a 
more heterogeneous fleet. An airline with only one type of 
plane in its fleet will have a fleet diversity score of zero (i.e., 
is highly specialized). 
We wanted to be sure that our generalist and specialist cod- 
ings were not simply size categories. Although generalists 
are usually large and specialists small, size and generalism 
are really separate concepts. There are small generalists and 
large specialists. Recent work in organizational ecology has 
noted the importance of distinguishing size effects from gen- 
eralism effects (Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan, 2001). We there- 
fore included separate measures of airline size. Since we 
controlled for size in all models, we should be able to detect 
the independent effect of generalism or specialism in our 
results. In our data, size and generalism are correlated at 
.594. This indicates that while size and form do covary, there 
is still a fair amount of independent information in the gener- 
alism/specialism variable. Some airlines in our sample are 
large, in the sense that they have many departures, yet they 
also have homogeneous fleets. Mesa West is one example, 
and Southwest Airlines, which still flies with only one type of 
airplane in its fleet, is another. America West, in contrast, is a 
relatively small generalist. 
Control Variables 
Prior studies suggest several control variables that are impor- 
tant for these analyses. One control is airline size, as small 
carriers tend to have higher accident and incident rates than 
large carriers. We used a commonly accepted measure of air- 
line size: Revenue passenger miles (in thousands) flown by 
each airline during the prior year. These data are available 
from the Air Traffic Statistics published by the U.S. Depart- 
ment of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 
As this variable is highly skewed, we logged it before enter- 
ing it into the analysis. 
Another important control variable is the airline's experience 
with accidents and incidents. We wanted to be sure that the 
main independent variable, accident heterogeneity, was inde- 
pendent of accident volume. Additionally, as noted earlier, 
there is substantial research showing that organizations tend 
to improve with experience (see Argote, 1999, for a review). 
While this effect, to our knowledge, has not been shown for 
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2 
We also ran models in which we substi- 
tuted cumulative departures as a mea- 
sure of industry experience, with no 
change in the hypothesized results. 
3 
When exact data on departures, miles 
flown, and airline profitability were miss- 
ing, we used the size distributions of 
firms with observed values for these vari- 
ables to impute values for the missing 
cases. We coded airlines into small, medi- 
um, and large and randomly assigned a 
value from a uniform distribution of the 
variables for other firms in the relevant 
size category for the relevant year. 
Almost all of the missing data were for 
very small airlines. We also ran analyses 
excluding these airlines from the analy- 
ses, with no difference in the hypothe- 
sized results. 
error reduction as a dependent variable, there is no reason to 
think that it might not apply. That is, organizations may tend 
to reduce their error rates as a function of the volume of 
error experience (rather than, or in addition to, the hetero- 
geneity of experience). Thus, we used the cumulative num- 
ber of prior accidents and incidents for each airline, using the 
same rolling three-year window as our heterogeneity mea- 
sure. We also discounted this experience variable in the 
same way as the heterogeneity variable, using the age of 
experience. Thus, for accidents that occurred in 1990, we 
used the cumulative number of accidents experienced by 
that airline from 1987 to 1989 (discounted so that 1987 acci- 
dents carry 1/3 the weight of 1989 accidents). 
As our data are left truncated at 1983, we included organiza- 
tional age as a fifth control variable. This controls for the left- 
truncation on variables like the number of miles flown and 
the number of prior accidents for those airlines that existed 
prior to 1983. We also obtained data on airline profitability, 
measured as return on assets, to control for the possibility 
that less profitable airlines may cut corners on safety and 
thus have more accidents than more profitable airlines, an 
effect found by Rose (1990). We also controlled for the 
severity of each accident or incident, as it may be that more 
severe accidents have more causes attributed to them. 
Severity data are available from the NTSB reports, where 
severity is reported on a scale of 1-4 (1 = not at all severe, 
e.g., a minor injury occurred, to 4 = severe, e.g., one or more 
deaths occurred). 
Finally, we also included variables that measure industry-level 
cumulative experience, which increases with time, to control 
for effects that are associated with a change in airlines' acci- 
dent and incident rates over time as well as the influence of 
experience outside the organization. Changes over time may 
be due to things like general technological improvements, 
increased regulatory surveillance or other regulatory changes, 
or other factors outside the airline (as within-airline improve- 
ments are captured in airline-level variables). Outside experi- 
ence (the experience of other airlines) may also affect air- 
lines' accident rates directly, as some studies have shown 
that firms can learn from the production and operating experi- 
ence of their competitors (Zimmerman, 1982; Irwin and 
Klenow, 1994; Ingram and Baum, 1997). We controlled for 
industry experience with a variable measuring cumulative rev- 
enue miles for all airlines (in millions).2 This variable was 
lagged by one year. As this variable was highly skewed, we 
logged it prior to entering it into the analysis. We also con- 
ducted analyses using dummy variables for each year 
(1983-1997) and a measure of elapsed time instead of these 
industry-level measures. The results of our main hypothe- 
sized effects did not differ in these analyses.3 
Analysis 
The data consist of a panel of observations on organization- 
years. The full sample included 2,710 firm-years of observa- 
tions. But 929 of these observations occurred in firm-years 
in which the airline in question had no accidents or inci- 
dents during the prior three years, so the heterogeneity 
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variable could not be calculated for these airlines during 
these years. To be sure that excluding these observations 
did not bias our results, we ran analyses using the Heck- 
man (1979) selection bias model to estimate the dependent 
variable (accident and incident rates) in the full sample. We 
then used the parameter estimates (the inverse Mills ratio 
scores) from that model in a second stage model to predict 
the effects of heterogeneity on accident and incident rates 
for those firms that had at least one accident or incident 
during the prior three years. The hazard rate from the selec- 
tion model is labeled "hazard" in the subsequent analyses 
and effectively controls for the likelihood of an observation 
being included in the subsample (i.e., the likelihood of hav- 
ing one or more accidents or incidents in the prior three 
years). 
Our main analyses used annual accident and incident rates 
as the dependent variable. As we had multiple observations 
for each airline, and airlines may have had more than one 
accident or incident in a given year, we used random- 
effects regression to correct for firm-specific autocorrela- 
tion. Airlines vary in characteristics that might affect their 
accident rates, e.g., they have older fleets, they operate in 
areas with harsh weather conditions, etc. These firm-specif- 
ic characteristics affect rates across airlines and also mean 
that the longitudinally clustered data violate the underlying 
assumption of independence. One way to account for unob- 
served heterogeneity with these types of data is to esti- 
mate random-effects models that account simultaneously 
for within- and between-effects information. The random- 
effects estimator is the equivalent of estimating (yt - Oy,) = 
(1 - O)a + (xt - Oxi)P + [(1 - 0)vj + (eit - Oej)] where vi is the 
firm-specific residual, it is the error term, and 0 is a func- 
tion of v2 and a.2. We also ran models using a fixed-effects 
estimator, and all hypothesized results remained unchanged 
in these models (results of these analyses are available 
from the authors). 
RESULTS 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for key 
study variables. There are some fairly high correlations 
among the independent variables. Many of the largest are 
among variables that are not run in the same model (e.g., 
within-event heterogeneity and across-event heterogeneity 
are correlated at .71). Own prior events (our experience mea- 
sure) and specialism are fairly highly correlated with some of 
the heterogeneity measures. Our large sample size, however, 
produces a high level of statistical power, which can over- 
come even extremely high correlations among variables (e.g., 
r > .95) (Mason and Perreault, 1991), but we can also assess 
results independent of collinearity concerns by using nested 
models. This allows us to compare model fit across models, 
thus overcoming any problems of interpretation that might be 
caused by multicollinearity among the independent variables, 
as multicollinearity does not affect model fit. We therefore 
used nested models for our primary analyses and report the 
significance of changes in model fit using likelihood ratio 
tests. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Key Study Variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 
1. Event rate (acc./inc. per 100k departures) 4.07 10.77 .00 117.44 
2. Accident rate 2.42 8.46 .00 110.00 .90 
3. Incident rate 1.72 6.17 .00 117.44 .74 .49 
4. Within-event heterogeneity (disc.) .44 .23 .02 1.35 -.06 -.05 -.05 
5. Across-event heterogeneity (disc.) 2.19 1.99 .00 6.78 -.15 -.14 -.09 .71 
6. Within-accident heterogeneity (disc.) .42 .21 .00 1.21 -.06 -.07 -.04 .88 
7. Across-accident heterogeneity (disc.) .99 .74 .00 3.94 -.12 -.08 -.08 .73 
8. Within-incident heterogeneity (disc.) .31 .19 .00 .99 -.03 -.02 -.02 .93 
9. Across-incident heterogeneity (disc.) 2.04 1.47 .00 4.29 -.09 -.02 -.06 .61 
10. Level of specialism (fleet diversity) .68 .82 .00 2.41 .14 .10 .10 -.31 
11. Own prior events (disc.) 2.89 4.82 .00 26.00 -.15 -.15 -.09 .58 
12. Industry experience 9.93 .96 8.12 11.07 -.03 .01 -.03 .13 
13. Airline size 10.29 3.30 .00 13.73 -.20 -.18 -.15 .44 
14. Airline age 16.99 17.22 .00 76.00 -.10 -.15 -.08 .42 
15. Airline profitability .36 4.04 -19.56 9.40 .03 .04 .01 -.09 
16. Accident/incident severity 1.36 .65 1.00 4.00 .13 .11 .10 .20 
Variable 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
6. Within-accident heterogeneity (disc.) .72 
7. Acrbss-accident heterogeneity (disc.) .94 .78 
8. Within-incident heterogeneity (disc.) .69 .54 .39 
9. Across-incident heterogeneity (disc.) .71 .49 .42 .84 
10. Level of specialism (fleet diversity) -.63 -.29 -.62 -.18 -.54 
11. Own prior events (disc.) .82 .56 .86 .59 .81 -.63 
12. Industry experience .19 .18 .13 .16 .18 -.08 -.01 
13. Airline size .53 .41 .40 .38 .32 -.59 .50 -.08 
14. Airline age .46 .40 .44 .47 .44 -.74 .75 .11 .54 
15. Airline profitability -.19 -.05 -.08 -.04 -.06 .13 -.14 -.04 -.09 .05 
16. Accident/incident severity .32 .20 .20 .18 .18 -.23 .52 -.02 .24 .23 -.02 
Accident and Incident Rates 
Table 4 presents the results of a random-effects regression in 
which the dependent variable is the number of accidents and 
incidents per 100,000 departures for each airline. Model 1 of 
table 4 includes only the control variables, and results show 
that older airlines tend to have fewer accidents and incidents 
than newer airlines. Our experience effect (own prior events, 
which are prior accidents and incidents) is negative and sig- 
nificant, indicating a basic learning effect: experience with 
accidents and incidents decreases subsequent accident/inci- 
dent rates. Average prior event severity is positively related 
to subsequent event rates. Airline size, profitability, and 
industry experience do not appear to affect accident and inci- 
dent rates in this model. 
To test H1 and H4, whether heterogeneity or homogeneity 
reduces subsequent accident rates, we first added a mea- 
sure of discounted within-event heterogeneity in model 2. As 
model 2 shows, the effect of within-event heterogeneity is 
negative and significant, supporting H1. The more heteroge- 
neous the airline's prior accident and incident experience, the 
lower its subsequent accident and incident rate. Model fit 
improves significantly with the addition of prior experience 
heterogeneity. Thus, across all airlines, it appears that airlines 
learn more from heterogeneous than homogeneous accident 
and incident experiences. The coefficient on within-event het- 
erogeneity is estimated at -3.840 (standard error = 1.15). 
Thus, an increase of .23 in discounted within-event 
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Table 4 
Random Variable Effects Estimates of Carrier Accident and Incident Rates (Events per 100,000 Departures) 
Variable 1 2 3 4* 5 
(Log) Airline size 0.125 0.160 0.143 0.157 0.159 
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.087) (0.089) 
Airline age -0.215" -0.226" -0.214" -0.877" -0.836" 
(0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.129) (0.133) 
Own prior events -0.041' -0.045' -0.022 -0.244" -0.114 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.094) (0.094) 
Airline profitability (ROA) -0.004 -0.003 -0.020 0.011 0.007 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.055) (0.056) 
(Log) Industry experience 1.390 1.604 1.703 1.541 1.499 
(0.871) (0.876) (0.883) (0.813) (0.814) 
Event severity 2.239" 2.238" 2.339" 2.134" 2.136" 
(0.378) (0.376) (0.376) (0.334) (0.338) 
Within-event heterogeneity -3.840" -5.984" 
(1.150) (1.667) 
Across-event heterogeneity -0.834" -1.814" 
(0.258) (0.337) 
Hazard 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.009 0.006 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant -6.372 -11.250* -12.944" -12.454 -12.872 
(4.666) (4.679) (4.752) (8.459) (8.460) 
N (total firm-years) 1781 1781 1781 1265 1265 
Log-likelihood -5167.48 -5148.61 -5162.26 -3170.42 -3169.84 
Likelihood ratio 37.74" 10.44" 
D.f. (vs. model no.) 1 (M1) 1 (M1) 
Variable 6t 7t 8* 9* 
(Log) Airline size -0.118 -0.103 0.184 0.192 
(0.114) (0.115) (0.077) (0.084) 
Airline age -0.238" -0.208" -0.222" -0.208- 
(0.064) (0.069) (0.061) (0.062) 
Own prior events -0.070' -0.135' -0.091' -0.037 
(0.030) (0.068) (0.044) (0.048) 
Airline profitability (ROA) 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.028) (0.029) 
(Log) Industry experience 0.988 0.989 1.263 1.244 
(0.584) (0.592) (0.648) (0.622) 
Event severity 1.177* 1.142' 1.845" 1.827" 
(0.408) (0.412) (0.312) (0.313) 
Within-event heterogeneity -2.384' -0.130 
(1.102) (0.738) 
Across-event heterogeneity -0.584' -0.525* 
(0.268) (0.260) 
Hazard 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant -14.874' -14.888' -8.872' -7.926 
(6.824) (6.439) (4.872) (4.826) 
N (total firm-years) 1781 1781 1781 1781 
Log-likelihood -4849.23 -4852.34 -5166.32 -5164.82 
" p < .01; * p < .05; two-tailed tests. 
* Models 4 and 5 eliminate accident causes over which airlines have relatively little control. 
t The dependent variable for this model is accidents per 100,000 departures; heterogeneity is calculated for accidents 
alone. 
* The dependent variable for this model is incidents per 100,000 departures; heterogeneity is calculated for incidents 
alone. 
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heterogeneity (one standard deviation) will reduce the 
expected accident and incident rate by approximately .88 
accidents and incidents per 100,000 departures. 
In model 3, we substituted a measure of discounted across- 
event heterogeneity, and the effect of across-event hetero- 
geneity is also negative and significant, again supporting H1 
and not H4. Thus, both within- and across-event heterogene- 
ity benefit learning. The coefficient on across-event hetero- 
geneity is estimated at -.834 (standard error = .258). Thus, 
an increase of 1.99 in discounted across-event heterogeneity 
reduces the expected accident and incident rate by approxi- 
mately 1.66 accidents and incidents per 100,000 departures. 
The across-event heterogeneity effect appears to be slightly 
stronger than the within-event heterogeneity effect, which 
means that airlines are able to utilize the additional informa- 
tion inherent in heterogeneity across different accidents and 
incidents. 
As our theory is at the airline level (airlines learn to reduce 
accidents and incidents), it would be best to conduct analy- 
ses on only those causes that are under the direct control of 
the airline, but it is not clear what is under airline control. 
Even factors that would normally appear not to be under air- 
line control can be controlled in some situations. For exam- 
ple, weather problems can sometimes be avoided by 
requesting different flight paths or altitude changes, and pas- 
senger-behavior problems are better controlled by some air- 
lines than others. Yet there is probably a continuum of influ- 
ence and control over various causal factors. To see whether 
results varied when we excluded accidents caused by factors 
less under airline control, we did the following. First, we 
interviewed airline executives to get their input about which 
factors are more under their control and which are less so. 
We conducted two sets of analyses in which we eliminated 
the eleven factors generally perceived to be less under their 
control (see description of these factors in Appendix A). In 
the first set of analyses, we eliminated these factors from 
both the independent and the dependent variables. In the 
second, we eliminated them from the dependent variable 
alone, assuming that these factors can be learned from, even 
though they are not under airlines' direct control. We reana- 
lyzed the data. We found that eliminating factors from the 
heterogeneity variable not under airlines' direct control does 
not change the significance of the results of models 2 and 3 
of table 4. We also found that eliminating factors from the 
dependent variable not under direct control of the airline 
(e.g., eliminating accidents caused by only those factors) 
does not change the significance of the heterogeneity result 
and, in fact, seems to strengthen it to some degree. This lat- 
ter analysis is reported in model 4, for within-event hetero- 
geneity, and model 5, for across-event heterogeneity. For 
these models, we excluded those 516 accidents and inci- 
dents whose causes were relatively less under airline control. 
As shown in models 4 and 5, the heterogeneity effects are 
stronger, and model fit improves with the deletion of these 
cases. Because including all accidents and incidents presents 
a more conservative test, we took the more conservative 
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approach and used the full sample of accidents in all further 
analyses. 
In models 6 through 9, we analyzed accidents and incidents 
separately. Model 6 includes accidents alone as the depen- 
dent variable and within-accident heterogeneity as an inde- 
pendent variable. Model 7 repeats model 6, but across- 
accident heterogeneity is substituted for within-accident 
heterogeneity. Model 8 includes incidents alone as the 
dependent variable and within-incident heterogeneity as an 
independent variable. Model 9 repeats model 8, but across- 
accident heterogeneity is substituted for within-accident het- 
erogeneity. For these analyses, we used discounted number 
of prior accidents (models 6 and 7) and discounted number of 
prior incidents (models 8 and 9) as experience controls. 
Models 6-9 show that the effect of prior experience hetero- 
geneity on the reduction in subsequent errors applies to both 
accidents and incidents. More heterogeneous across- 
accident experience improves subsequent accident rates, 
and more heterogeneous across-incident experience 
improves subsequent incident rates. These results apply to 
both within- and across-accident heterogeneity, though the 
effect of within-accident heterogeneity on incident rates is 
only marginally significant (p < .10). Overall, then, it seems 
that heterogeneity benefits airlines, as prior heterogeneous 
causes result in a reduction in both subsequent accident and 
incident rates. 
Pilot Errors 
We conducted several analyses designed to delve more 
deeply into the question of why heterogeneity leads to a 
reduction in accident and incident rates. We first ran models 
testing hypothesis 2, whether heterogeneity leads to a reduc- 
tion in operator errors. Table 5 reports these analyses. The 
dependent variable is the number of pilot errors reported for 
each airline for each year. We used a random-effects 
Table 5 
Random Effects Negative Binomial Estimates of Number of Errors 
1 2 3 4 
Variable Pilot errors Pilot errors Errors type X* Errors type Xt 
(Log) Airline size -0.190N -0.131" 0.011 0.024 (0.020) (0.018) (0.010) (0.020) 
(Log) Industry experience -2.41 9 -2.367" (0.570) (0.598) 
Number of prior pilot errors 0.022" 0.024" (0.009) (0.010) 
Number of prior errors of type X 0.007 -0.176" (0.005) (0.021) 
Across-event heterogeneity -1.247- (0.437) 
Constant 3.487" 3.295" -23.990 1.194' 
(0.618) (0.621) (20.788) (0.542) 
N 1781 1781 23467 7382 
Wald chi square 12.83 18.94 5.92 72.08 
Log likelihood -2949.37 -2836.29 -6234.33 -185.43 
" p < .01; ' p < .05; two-tailed tests. 
* Sample is all accidents and incidents. 
t Sample is only single-cause accidents and incidents. 
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negative binomial model, as the dependent variable is a 
count variable, and the random-effects specification controls 
for nonindependence among observations. Model 1 of table 
5 presents the results of a set of control variables that might 
explain the number of pilot errors reported. As model 1 
shows, the number of pilot errors decreased significantly 
with increasing industry experience. Large airlines have 
fewer pilot errors than small airlines. In model 2, we added 
the effect of discounted across-accident-and-incident hetero- 
geneity on current pilot errors, and the effect is negative and 
significant. This shows that airlines with heterogeneous acci- 
dent and incident experience tend to have fewer pilot errors 
than airlines with homogeneous accident and incident experi- 
ences. In other results (available from the authors), we also 
found the same effect for within-accident/incident hetero- 
geneity, though the effect is weaker than across-accident 
heterogeneity. 
We had suggested that airlines with heterogeneous experi- 
ences may be learning better than those with homogeneous 
experiences because they are delving deeper into causes and 
not using a simple blame-the-operator esponse, and our evi- 
dence is consistent with this explanation. An alternative 
explanation for this result is that pilots themselves are actual- 
ly learning more from heterogeneous accident and incident 
experiences and thus make fewer subsequent errors. This 
argument is a variant on the idea that variance is necessary 
for learning to occur. We cannot disentangle these two 
process explanations with the current data structure, though 
the result showing that across-accident heterogeneity is 
stronger than within-accident heterogeneity suggests that 
the process is more likely to be occurring at the airline level, 
as different pilots are likely to be involved in different acci- 
dents and incidents. But whichever is the source of learn- 
ing-airline or pilot or both-the results support the idea that 
heterogeneity aids learning. 
We conducted additional analyses to see which other types 
of errors are reduced as a function of prior heterogeneity. 
Results indicate that some other forms of human error are 
reduced, including ground-crew error, flight-attendant error, 
and maintenance errors. In all these cases, prior error hetero- 
geneity tends to decrease subsequent errors of these types 
but has no effect on other types of human error, such as Air 
Traffic Control errors or passenger errors. Prior error hetero- 
geneity also reduces subsequent errors that are due to 
supervisory factors but has no effect on errors due to exter- 
nal factors or faulty equipment (details of all these results are 
available from the authors). In general, these results show 
that learning related to human factors that are most associat- 
ed with the aircraft itself (pilot, ground crew, flight attendant, 
and maintenance personnel) benefits most from heterogene- 
ity. This suggests that either heterogeneity reduces the ten- 
dency to blame human beings, and/or human beings learn 
from the diverse experiences provided by heterogeneity. 
Homogeneity in Causes 
We have already shown that heterogeneity, not homogeneity, 
is beneficial in reducing accident and incident rates, as we 
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found support for H1 and not H4. But we also wanted to 
directly test hypothesis 3, whether the number of prior caus- 
es of a certain type reduces subsequent causes of that type. 
There are actually many different ways of testing this rela- 
tionship, and we conducted multiple tests using several dif- 
ferent ways of aggregating causes. As a general test, we 
analyzed the number of each of the 23 causes each airline 
experienced in a given year, as a function of the number of 
prior causes of each type experienced by that airline. Thus 
we were modeling the following: 
CxAYz = sum(CxAyYz1 .. z-n) 
where Cx = Cause 1 ... 23, Ay = Airline 1 ... 310, and Yz = 
Year 1984... 1997. 
Model 3 of table 5 runs this analysis on the full sample of 
accidents and incidents. We used a random-effects negative 
binomial model, as the dependent variable is a count variable, 
and the random-effects specification controls for nonindepen- 
dence among observations. Model 3 shows the number of 
prior causes of a given type does not reduce the number of 
subsequent causes of that same type. When we ran this 
analysis on only single-cause accidents (model 4), we found 
that the number of prior causes of a given type does reduce 
the number of subsequent causes of that same type, but this 
effect is restricted to one-cause accidents. In other models, 
we found that subsequent accidents with multiple causes are 
not reduced. Also, double-cause and triple-cause accidents 
do not reduce the rate of subsequent accidents with those 
same double or triple causes. Thus, only the most extreme 
form of homogeneity, e.g., a single cause, is beneficial for 
learning, which provides support for H3 only in limited cases. 
An alternative explanation is that a relationship between 
more accidents of a given type in the current period and 
fewer accidents of that type in future periods is prone to 
regression to the mean, but we did not find any support for 
H3 except in the narrow case of single-cause accidents. If 
regression to the mean were operating, there is no reason 
why it would operate only on single-cause accidents. There- 
fore, we think regression to the mean is not a likely alterna- 
tive explanation for our rather narrow support for this 
hypothesis. 
Generalism/Specialism and Learning Results 
The analyses in table 6 assess whether generalists and spe- 
cialists learn differently from heterogeneous accident experi- 
ences. The dependent variable is the accident and incident 
rate per 100,000 departures. Model 1 is a base model, includ- 
ing all the control variables, within-event heterogeneity, and 
level of specialism. In model 2, we added the interaction of 
discounted within-event heterogeneity with the variable indi- 
cating level of specialism, but the interaction of specialism 
and within-event heterogeneity is not significant. In model 3, 
we used discounted across-accident heterogeneity and, in 
model 4, the interaction of specialism and across-event het- 
erogeneity. The interaction of specialism and across-event 
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Table 6 
Random Variable Effects Estimates of Carrier Accident and Incident Rates (Events per 100,000 Departures)* 
1 2 3 4 
(Log) Airline size 0.131 0.134 0.095 0.077 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) 
Airline age -0.263" -0.261 # -0.276# -0.232- 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.084) 
Own prior events -0.044' 0.043' -0.013 -0.018 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Airline profitability (ROA) 0.005 0.004 -0.017 -0.020 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
(Log) Industry experience 1.170 1.230 1.200 1.765' 
(0.648) (0.087) (0.691) (0.691) 
Event severity 2.220W 2.230- 2.210- 2.180- 
(0.375) (0.375) (0.375) (0.375) 
Within-event heterogeneity -4.176- -4.640" 
(1.173) (1.689) 
Across-event heterogeneity -1.130R -2.280- 
(0.281) (0.557) 
Level of specialism 1.430 1.170 2.452- 0.986 
(0.878) (1.120) (0.949) (1.130) 
Specialism x within-event het. -0.562 
(1.480) 
Specialism x across-event het. -0.731* 
(0.306) 
Hazard rate 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) 
Constant -11.808' -11.342* -14.756- -12.640' 
(4.680) (4.840) (4.800) (4.860) 
N (total firm-years) 1781 1781 1781 1781 
Log likelihood -5147.28 -5147.20 -5158.92 -5154.07 
Likelihood ratio 0.16 9.70- 
D.f. (vs. model no.) 1 (M1) 1 (M3) 
5 6 7 8 
(Log) Airline size -0.671 -0.762- -0.117- -0.076 
(0.277) (0.289) (0.162) (0.191) 
Airline age -0.081 -0.687" 0.021 -0.903- 
(0.116) (0.245) (0.105) (0.338) 
Own prior events -0.010 0.023 -0.911 -0.989- 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.187) (0.210) 
Airline profitability (ROA) -0.084 0.024 0.234 0.398 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.591) (0.672) 
(Log) Industry experience 1.290 1.920 -2.850- -7.450- 
(0.694) (1.180) (0.678) (1.400) 
Event severity -0.878' -1.050- 3.520- 2.810- 
(0.428) (0.432) (0.549) (0.559) 
Within-event heterogeneity 
Across-event heterogeneity -0.469- -0.872* -0.192 -0.169 
(0.230) (0.278) (0.781) (0.791) 
Level of specialism 
Specialism x within-event het. 
Specialism x across-event het. 
Hazard rate 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.008 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant 2.240 2.340 -25.190 R -57.310R 
(6.820) (6.450) (6.790) (11.000) 
N (total firm-years) 855 855 926 926 
Log likelihood -2079.42 0.08t -2915.85 0.17t 
- p < .01; * p < .05; two-tailed tests. 
* Models 5 and 6 analyze only specialists, and models 7 and 8 analyze only generalists. Models 6 and 8 are fixed-effects 
models. 
t R-square (overall). 
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heterogeneity in model 4 is negative and significant. This indi- 
cates that specialists with a high degree of heterogeneity in 
prior experience learn more (i.e., their accident and incident 
rate is reduced), relative to other firms, but this effect only 
holds for across-event heterogeneity. Thus, H5, which pre- 
dicted that specialists would learn more from heterogeneous 
experience than generalists, is supported, but only for across- 
event heterogeneity. 
To explore this effect in more detail, we split the sample into 
generalist and specialist airlines, initially using a median split 
as a cutoff. Using the median split, the generalist airlines had 
a total of 734 accidents and incidents in our sample period, 
with an average rate of 2.82 events per 100,000 departures. 
The specialist airlines had a total of 612 accidents and inci- 
dents, with an average rate of 7.42 events per 100,000 
departures. The generalist airlines had more heterogeneous 
accidents-their across-event heterogeneity averaged 3.63, 
while specialists were only .692. This difference in hetero- 
geneity, however, was effectively controlled for in model 4 by 
including the main effect of specialism, so the interaction 
effect in model 4 was found independent of any difference in 
accident heterogeneity across generalists and specialists. 
For illustrative purposes, we ran separate models on the gen- 
eralist and specialist subsamples. The sample for model 5 
was used on specialists alone, and the results show that 
prior error heterogeneity reduces the accident and incident 
rate for specialist airlines. Model 6 is the same as model 5, 
except that we used a fixed-effects estimator as a more 
stringent test of whether unobserved heterogeneity was 
affecting our results. Model 6 shows that the effect of prior 
heterogeneity on specialists remains, and is in fact stronger, 
with the fixed-effect specification. Thus, we are confident 
that specialists are learning from across-event heterogeneity. 
It also appears that within the specialist categories, those 
specialists that are larger have lower accident rates than 
those that are smaller, as the effect of size is negative and 
significant. It also appears that specialists with more severe 
prior events tend to have fewer subsequent events, an effect 
opposite that of the generalists. 
Model 7, which includes only generalists, shows no effect of 
prior experience heterogeneity for generalists. But model 7 
also shows that the effect of industry experience (cumulative 
miles flown) is significant, indicating that generalists are 
learning from outside factors that change over time, in a way 
that specialists are not (models 5 and 6). Model 8 is the 
same as model 7, except that we use the fixed-effects speci- 
fication. As with the specialist results, these generalist 
effects remain when we use the more stringent fixed-effects 
test. 
We also tried several different methods of splitting the gen- 
eralism/specialism variable to see when the learning effects 
hold. Results showed that the effect of prior across-event 
heterogeneity in causes applies to all airlines except the large 
major carriers, which are the most extreme generalists. The 
large major carriers are the only airlines that do not learn 
from prior experience heterogeneity and who appear to learn 
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from alternate sources (e.g., industry experience). (Details of 
these analyses are available from the authors.) 
Thus, it appears that the factors affecting learning (reduction 
in accident and incident rates) are different for generalists 
and specialists. Specialists appear to learn from heterogene- 
ity in prior accidents and incidents. Generalists, in contrast, 
do not learn from prior experience heterogeneity, though 
they do learn from their own accumulated experience. 
Instead, they learn from outside factors. These outside fac- 
tors are captured in the industry-miles variable and are likely 
to include such things as general technological improve- 
ments, learning by the industry as a whole, and changes in 
regulation that result in reduced accident and incident rates. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study contribute to our understanding of 
variation in how organizations learn from their prior error 
experience. It appears that, in general, experiences with het- 
erogeneous causes produces more learning than experience 
with homogeneous causes. This is likely to be due to hetero- 
geneity producing a deeper, broader search for causality that 
avoids simple explanations like blame the pilot. There is one 
specialized case in which homogeneity benefits learning: in 
simple one-cause accidents. In anything more complex, the 
greater the level of complexity, the greater the learning. In 
addition, generalist airlines appear to learn from different 
sources of experience than specialists do. These results have 
interesting implications for theories of learning and organiza- 
tional form and for work on organizational errors, as well as 
for understanding the increasing complexity of the causes of 
accidents. 
Learning Theories 
Organizational learning theorists represent learning as history- 
dependent, routine-based systems that adapt incrementally 
to past experience. Consistent with this, we found that air- 
lines learn incrementally from their own accident experience 
and from the heterogeneity of causes in their own prior acci- 
dent and incident experiences. We also found that the bene- 
fits of learning from heterogeneity seem to apply primarily to 
specialist organizations, as only their accident and incident 
rates are reduced with heterogeneity in prior causes. Our 
results also show that only generalists learn from accumulat- 
ed industry experience. The accident and incident rate of 
generalist airlines (but not specialists) decreases over time 
and with the accumulation of others' experience. Thus, gen- 
eralists seem to learn more from the experience of the indus- 
try as a whole than specialists do. There are several possible 
reasons why this might be so. 
First, it may be that generalists experience more pressure to 
respond to external experience than specialists do because 
regulatory agencies put more pressure on generalists than 
they do on specialists. This response, evidenced by a reduc- 
tion in accident rates, comes as the result of external pres- 
sures (the FAA) rather than internal experience. It may also 
be that generalist carriers are generally more sensitive to the 
accident and incident experiences and responses to them 
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experienced by the industry as a whole than the specialist 
airlines are. They probably have better access to industry- 
level information than specialist airlines do and are also more 
likely to have specialized internal departments charged with 
analyzing industry data than specialists are. 
Second, an additional factor associated with industry-level 
experience is an increase in the heterogeneity of accident 
experience over time. Figure 2 graphs accident and incident 
heterogeneity for each year covered by our sample and 
Figure 2. Heterogeneity in causes of accidents and incidents over time. 
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A formal analysis of this effect shows 
that year is positively related to hetero- 
geneity I(F1,1780) = 33.49, p < .011. 
shows that accident heterogeneity has been increasing over 
time.4 Thus, it may be that generalists, in addition to paying 
attention to information on accidents by the system as a 
whole, learn more from system-level heterogeneity than from 
their own heterogeneity in experience. Future research 
designed to test these different explanations for the differ- 
ences between generalist and specialist airlines would be 
useful. 
There now seems to be a fair amount of convergence across 
studies on the idea that the organizational form affects learn- 
ing. As noted earlier, Barnett, Greve, and Park (1994) and 
Ingram and Baum (1997) showed that generalist organiza- 
tions learn differently from specialist organizations. In gener- 
al, what these studies show is that generalist firms do not 
learn as well from their own experience as specialists do, but 
these studies did not separate the quantity of experience 
from the characteristics of that experience. We separated 
quantity (e.g., number of prior accidents) from characteristics 
(heterogeneity of causes of prior accidents) and, in doing so, 
found that while both generalists and specialists tend to learn 
from the amount of experience, they learn differently from 
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the characteristics of that experience. Thus, our findings, 
along with those of others who have studied the link 
between generalism and specialism and learning, are 
promising in that they illuminate the tensions between strate- 
gic choice and learning, in which the choice of form affects 
an organization's ability to learn from certain types of 
experience. 
In addition to providing evidence on the relationship between 
learning and organizational form, our study contributes to 
learning theories by developing and showing the effects of a 
variable that is not yet well studied: the heterogeneity or 
homogeneity of prior experience. Beckman and Haunschild 
(2002) showed that experience heterogeneity affects corpo- 
rate acquisitions, but their study looked at experience of oth- 
ers, not a firm's own heterogeneity or homogeneity of experi- 
ence. Our results show that the characteristics of a firm's 
own past experience are important, at least for specialist 
firms. Thus, our results contribute to one goal in the learning 
literature: that of understanding the sources of variation in 
learning rates across different organizations (Argote, 1999). 
Our results show that organizations with experience with 
heterogeneous causes will learn more than organizations 
with experience with homogeneous causes. In addition, 
unlike Beckman and Haunschild's study, in which hetero- 
geneity was created by variance in outcomes (i.e., successful 
and unsuccessful acquisitions), in this study, airlines are 
learning without being able to directly compare the causes of 
accidents (failures) and the causes of no-accidents (success- 
es). That is, it is quite difficult for anyone to observe the pres- 
ence or absence of causes present in those flights that did 
not have an accident. Instead, learning in this case is driven 
by the salience of failures, which is a powerful driver of learn- 
ing (Sitkin, 1992), and not a comparison of success and 
failure. 
Finally, we also contribute to the small but growing body of 
work on how and when organizations can learn from failure 
(Sitkin, 1992; Kim and Miner, 2000). Accidents and incidents 
are a form of failure, and we showed that failure can be 
learned from, especially when it has heterogeneous causes. 
One issue with all research on failure is that failures are gen- 
erally rare events. In this study, they are especially rare (on 
an absolute basis) for the specialist airlines. The specialist air- 
lines have fewer absolute numbers of accidents and inci- 
dents than the generalist airlines (though, as noted earlier, 
their failure rate per departure is actually higher). Yet our evi- 
dence shows that such failures can lead to learning. This is in 
keeping with studies showing that failure is an important 
stimulant to organizational earning, in part because failures 
are highly salient and difficult to hide (Sitkin, 1992; Greve, 
1998; Miner et al., 1999; Kim and Miner, 2000). What is inter- 
esting is that, in our study, the specialists are learning from 
their own failures, but the generalists seem to be learning 
from the failures of others, through the accumulated experi- 
ence with heterogeneity in causes in their industry. Thus, 
both are learning from relatively rare events, but the source 
of these events is different. Future research into exactly why 
generalists and specialists learn differently from these differ- 
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Learning from Complexity 
ent sources of failure information would be useful. Research 
could also profit from contrasting learning from rare, salient 
events, like failures, and learning from common, nonsalient 
events, such as cumulative production experience. Much of 
the learning curve research to date has focused on common, 
nonsalient events, and yet this study showed that rare 
events also promote learning. Finally, research could profit 
from investigating whether all failures affect learning, possi- 
bly by comparing across different industries and/or different 
types of failure events (e.g., accidents, financial crises, orga- 
nizational failures). As noted earlier, it may be that the airline 
industry has industry-specific features that promote learning 
from failure, features not present in other industries (Perrow, 
1984). Such differences are a fruitful place to begin to deep- 
en our understanding of the conditions under which failures 
can be a source of learning (cf. Ocasio, 1995). 
One strength of our study is that we analyzed a process-ori- 
ented explanation for the results, in the context of a large- 
scale study looking at performance improvement. Much of 
the work in the area of organizational earning can be classi- 
fied according to whether its primary focus is on learning as 
an outcome or learning as a process. Some people study 
learning as an outcome, one that can be seen in performance 
improvement or a change in organizational routines (e.g., 
Ingram and Baum, 1997; Baum and Ingram, 1998; Kim and 
Miner, 2000; also see Argote, 1999, for a summary of earlier 
work). Some people study learning as a process, not tied to a 
particular outcome. For example, there is much work on 
learning problems, such as that organizations tend to search 
locally rather than broadly (Levinthal and March, 1993), or 
how improvisation activities affect knowledge acquisition in 
organizations (Miner, Bassoff, and Moorman, 2001). Our 
study is primarily outcome-oriented in that we studied perfor- 
mance improvements (reduced error rates) but also theorized 
and tested some process-level explanations for results (e.g., 
the pilot-error analyses). Combining outcome and process in 
a single study is rarely done but is important for supporting 
the idea that learning processes are at work and for con- 
tributing to a more detailed contextual understanding of orga- 
nizational learning. 
Like all studies, ours has some limitations that suggest direc- 
tions for future research in this area. One limitation is that, 
while we made some efforts to explore the processes under- 
lying the heterogeneity effects, process factors could only be 
explored in a limited way. Questions about exactly how het- 
erogeneous accident causes reduce subsequent accidents 
are still relatively unexplored, and thus future research inves- 
tigating the process underlying this effect would be valuable. 
For example, airlines' responses to their accidents could be 
tracked over time, and detailed data on responses to hetero- 
geneous and homogeneous accident causes could be collect- 
ed. In addition, our primary data sources, airline accident 
reports, are subject to errors and biases of their own (Tamuz, 
1987). We don't always know, for example, whether there 
are changes in accident causes or just changes in accident 
reporting. Our data show a decline in pilot errors over time, 
but is this due to an actual decline in such errors or to a 
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decline in the tendency to blame the pilot in a situation in 
which causes are ambiguous? While such changes in report- 
ing are not likely to bias our conclusions (i.e., it is not likely 
that investigators will report more heterogeneous causes for 
the accidents and incidents of those airlines that subsequent- 
ly experience a decrease in accident and incident rates), it is 
still important to try to investigate the possible reporting bias- 
es in aviation errors. 
Organizational Errors 
The findings of this study take on added importance because 
they occur in the context of events of great consequence. 
Accidents and incidents (as well as other disasters) need to 
be investigated because they have a significant impact on 
organizations and society (Perrow, 1984). While many impor- 
tant studies of accidents and incidents have been done, they 
tend to be case studies of individual accidents or disasters. 
Accidents and incidents have also served as a foundation for 
the development of interesting theories, such as Perrow's 
(1984) normal accidents theory and Reason's (1997) discus- 
sions of the latent conditions underlying many accidents. 
There are, however, very few large-scale empirical tests of 
theories of organizational accidents and errors. Seeking to 
address this gap, we found that such errors are affected by 
the characteristics of prior experience with errors, specifical- 
ly, the heterogeneity of their causes. 
Our results are consistent with Weick's (1987) discussion of 
the benefits of requisite variety for the reduction of aviation 
errors. Weick noted the benefits of increasing system variety 
for reducing errors and proposed that variety can be 
increased through such mechanisms as promoting individual 
diversity, a focus on face-to-face interaction styles, reducing 
rigid bureaucratic ontrols, and promoting individual discre- 
tion over decisions. Our results are consistent with Weick 
(1987) in that we found that increasing system diversity 
(through the diverse information available from experience 
with heterogeneous causes) is valuable and showed the 
enhanced benefits of diverse information in specialist organi- 
zations, which are likely to have fewer rigid bureaucratic on- 
trols and more individual discretion than generalists. 
More generally, our results are also important for the study of 
other organizational errors and their causes. Some work in 
economics has investigated the effects on errors of such fac- 
tors as organizational profitability (Rose, 1990) and deregula- 
tion, but there has been little work in organizational theory on 
the causes or consequences of errors. Our study contributes 
to this literature by showing the important effects of organi- 
zational processes such as learning efforts and system con- 
straints on the management of errors. Empirical work on the 
learning curve has focused on productivity and firm survival, 
not reduction in errors. Yet examining reduced error frequen- 
cy and/or severity is an important way to study learning, 
because the organizational factors that result in error reduc- 
tion are as yet relatively unexplored. Also, knowing more 
about how errors are reduced has important practical implica- 
tions for both organizations and society. 
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Increased Complexity in Accident Causes over Time 
Our results also have interesting implications for the impact 
of the heterogeneity of experience over time. We found that 
heterogeneity in the causes of accidents has been increasing 
over time, which may contribute to explaining the increase in 
the number of airline accidents whose causes remain a mys- 
tery (Paztor and Matthews, 1999). One possibility is that the 
simple factors that caused accidents have been fixed, so 
what is left in the system are the more complex interactions. 
Thus, pilots no longer fly into thunderstorms. Turbulence is 
now much more predictable through improvements in weath- 
er technology. So, when an accident occurs now, it occurs as 
the result of several factors whose interaction is quite diffi- 
cult to predict. 
A second reason why the heterogeneity in accident causes 
may be increasing over time is that the underlying technology 
has become more complex, so the causes of errors become 
more complex. Thus, there is isomorphism between error 
complexity and technical complexity. A third possible reason 
for the increase might be the complexity of rules. The idea 
here is that errors create new rules. The U.S. airline system 
is heavily regulated, and accidents tend to generate a lot of 
scrutiny. New rules are often put in place in an attempt to 
prevent future accidents, with the result that, over time, rules 
proliferate. The problem with a proliferation of rules is that 
they can lead to problems and may actually increase accident 
rates. As Reason (1997) noted, rules designed to reduce the 
opportunities for one kind of error can relocate errors to other 
parts of the system. These parts are likely to be more 
opaque in the sense that they will contribute to more errors 
based on the complex interaction of multiple underlying fac- 
tors. The complexity of rules themselves may lead to a corre- 
sponding complexity in errors. 
A fourth possible cause for the increase in the complexity of 
accident causes over time might be that reporting complexity 
has increased. It could be that accidents are not inherently 
more complex now than previously but, rather, that investiga- 
tors are more open to looking for multiple causes and com- 
plex interactions of factors than they used to be. The dissem- 
ination of knowledge about how accidents can have multiple, 
complex, underlying factors (e.g., Perrow, 1984; Reason, 
1997; Vaughan, 1999) may be affecting the accident investi- 
gators themselves. Future research testing these different 
causes is needed and can contribute to our understanding of 
the evolution of knowledge management in technical 
systems. 
Our findings about how airlines learn from complexity sug- 
gest important features of the learning process. Beyond air- 
lines, the research presented here points to the importance 
of investigating learning processes and the interaction of 
learning and organizational form in other areas. Organizational 
learning from critical events other than airline accidents, such 
as industrial accidents, financial crises, and medical errors 
might similarly be affected by prior experience heterogeneity. 
Or learning from less drastic errors such as product recalls 
may be similarly affected by heterogeneity and organizational 
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form. The systemwide complexity of underlying causes may 
also increase over time for these types of events. The under- 
lying processes of learning and knowledge management in 
these systems are clearly important and deserving of further 
study. 
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APPENDIX A: Descriptions of Accident Cause Codes 
1. Weather-turbulence* 
2. Weather-other* 
3. Problematic ground conditions (not under control of facilities)* 
4. Pilot error 
5. Flight crew error 
6. Flight attendant error 
7. Ground crew error 
8. Equipment malfunction 
9. Maintenance error 
10. Manufacturer error* 
11. FAA supervision/procedures inadequate* 
12. Airline supervision/procedures inadequate 
13. Airline failure to incorporate correction 
14. Air traffic control error* 
15. Inadequate weather assistance* 
16. Passenger error* 
17. Pilot of other aircraft-error* 
18. Inadequate group coordination 
19. Birds* 
20. Facilities problem (e.g., runway maintenance)* 
21. Flight into terrain 
22. Unknown, undetermined 
23. Other-nonclassifiable 
* These are causes seen to be relatively less under the airline's control than 
other causes in the above list (based on interviews with airline executives) 
and were excluded from the dependent variable in the analysis reported in 
table 4, models 4 and 5. 
APPENDIX B: Sample NTSB Accident Report 
General Information 
Data Source: NTSB AVIATION ACCIDENT/INCIDENT DATABASE 
Report Number: ATL86LA090 
Local Date: 03/12/1986 
Local Time: 717 CST 
State: TN 
City: MEMPHIS 
Airport Name: MEMPHIS INTL 
Airport Id: MEM 
Event Type: ACCIDENT 
Injury Severity: SERIOUS 
Report Status: FINAL 
Mid Air Collision: NO 
Operations Information 
Category of Operation: SCHEDULED, PART 121 
Aircraft Type: AIRPLANE 
Aircraft Damage: NONE 
Phase of Flight: 530 CLIMB 
Aircraft Make/Model: BOEING B-727-22 
Operator Name: AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. 
Operator: AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC-AALA 
Narrative 
AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 502 EXPERIENCED A FIRE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATION ON NO. 1 ENGINE AS 
THE AIRCRAFT WAS CLIMBING THROUGH 6000 FEET. THE PILOT DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AND RETURNED 
TO MEMPHIS. FOLLOWING THE LANDING THE PILOT ORDERED A PASSENGER EMERGENCY EVACUATION. 
DURING THE EVACUATION THE REAR SLIDE DEFLATED AFTER THE SLIDE MATERIAL WAS PUNCTURED. THE 
EXAMINATION OF THE MATERIAL DISCLOSED THAT THE PUNCTURE WAS THE RESULT OF A SHOE HEEL. THE 
EXAMINATION OF THE FIRE WARNING SYSTEM DISCLOSED THAT A DUCT CONNECTOR IN THE SYSTEM HAD 
FAILED. THE INJURY RECEIVED BY THE INJURED PASSENGER RESULTED FROM JUMPING OFF THE LEFT WING 
SURFACE DURING THE EVACUATION PHASE. 
Sequence of Events 
Occurrence #: 1 430 MISCELLANEOUS/OTHER 
Phase of Operation: 530 CLIMB 
Findings 
Subject-Modifier-Personnel Cause/Factor 
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1 a. 12401(S)-1135(M) Factor 
FIRE WARNING SYSTEM, POWERPLANT-FAILURE, TOTAL 
2a. 17106(S)- 1135(M)-Factor 
MISC EQPT/FURNISHINGS, SLIDES-FAILURE, TOTAL 
4b. 24545(S)-3124(M)-4127(P) Cause 
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE-NOT FOLLOWED-PASSENGER 
Aircraft Information 
Number of Seats: 
Type of Operation: 
Domestic/International: 
Passenger/Cargo: 
Registration Number: 
Air Carrier Operating Certificates: 
Aircraft Fire: 
Injuries 
Fatal Serious Mir 
Crew 0 
Pass 0 
Other 0 
Invlvd 0 
150 
14 CFR 121 
DOMESTIC 
PASSENGER 
877AA 
FLAG CARRIER/DOMESTIC (121) 
NONE 
ior None 
0 0 7 
1 1 61 
0 0 0 
1 1 68 
Landing Gear: 
Certificated Maximum Gross Weight: 
Engine Make: 
Engine Model: 
Number of Engines: 
Engine Type: 
TRICYCLE-RETRACTABLE 
191500 
P&W 
JT8D-9A 
3 
TURBO FAN 
Environment/Location Information 
Basic Weather Conditions: 
Wind Direction (deg): 
Wind Speed (knots): 
Visibility (sm): 
Visibility RVR (ft): 
Visibility RW (sm): 
Cloud Height Above Ground Level (ft): 
Visibility Restrictions: 
Precipitation Type: 
Light Condition: 
Departure City: 
Departure State: 
Destination City: 
Destination State: 
Flight Plan Filed: 
ATC Clearance: 
VFR Approach/Landing: 
Event Location: 
Pilot-in-Command 
Certificates: 
Ratings: 
Plane: 
Non-Plane: 
Instrument: 
Had Current BFR: 
Months Since Last BFR: 
Medical Certificate: 
Medical Certificate Validity: 
Flight Time (Hours) 
Total: 
Make/Model: 
Instrument: 
Multi-Engine: 
VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS 
0 
0 
7 
0 
0 
0 
NONE 
NONE 
DAYLIGHT 
MEMPHIS 
TN 
NASHVILLE 
TN 
INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES (IFR) 
IFR 
PRECAUTIONARY LANDING 
ON AIRPORT 
AIRLINE TRANSPORT 
SINGLE ENGINE LAND, MULTIENGINE LAND 
NONE 
AIRPLANE 
YES 
3 
CLASS 1 
VALID MEDICAL-NO WAIVERS OR LIMITATIONS 
11670 
5450 
0 
0 
Last 24 Hrs: 
Last 30 Days: 
Last 90 Days: 
Rotorcraft: 
8 
0 
117 
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